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ABSTRACT

Only recently have some researchers begun to study and document efforts by Indian parents to ensure their children an adequate education. These research studies deal with the education of Indian Americans. Historical perspective is said to be an important part of this research and the two historical studies presented deal with the Colville Indians (Washington) and the Fort Berthold Indians (North Dakota). Since social science studies of specific reservations and of Indian schools can be of great potential value, different sections address the following: (1) the school and Indian culture, (2) an ethnographic study of the Chemawa boarding school for Indians in Oregon, and (3) studies of Indians in an urban area, Detroit. Another issue that is addressed is that of the extent to which teachers who educate both Indian and Anglo pupils are aware of sociocultural differences between the two groups. Questionning of established governmental policy in the field of Indian education is crucial and a final section addresses the role of federal policy in Indian affairs. The remainder of this document is devoted to a discussion of recent research bearing on the interrelationship of desegregation and the movement of people, mainly students. First, studies covering two states, three cities, and one county are reviewed. Second, a study of segregation in suburbs is examined, and third, the general argument about desegregation and white flight is updated. It is noted that the findings of the research reported here contradict many of the propositions that underly the Coleman thesis of white flight. It is also noted that unnoticed, residential segregation has found a welcome home in the suburbs. Finally, with respect to the white flight argument, both sides conceded that more than school desegregation may affect it. Until the study reported here, this was a matter of speculation. (Author/AM)

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Indian Americans

Few researchers have been interested in the education of Indian Americans. One can easily page through standard research compendia and textbooks without once running across the subject. Ignorance runs rife. The absence of Indian researchers is a principal reason for this lack of interest. Another is the failure of the research community to acknowledge the existence of deliberate, intentional educational disadvantage. The attempt to destroy Indian culture and society is deeply-rooted in the United States.

Only recently have some researchers begun to study and document efforts by Indian parents to ensure their children an adequate education. Historical perspective is a very important part of the research. Social science studies of specific reservations and Indian schools are of great potential value. Questioning of established governmental policy in the field of Indian education is crucial. In this issue of the *Research Review of Equal Education* we discuss studies representative of each type of research.

History

Two historical studies deal with the Colville Indians (Washington) and the Fort Berthold Indians (North Dakota).

The first, by Susanna A. Hayes, stresses the century-long campaign by federal educators to inculcate in Colville children a feeling of shame for the native culture. At present, she writes, "Indian children interpret the differences between their way of life and that of the white population as indications of their ignorance and cultural inferiority."[1] Since English is the present language of school instruction, few parents teach their children the native language.

In 1873, when the reservation's first school opened, many more children applied than could be accommodated. Two years later the Indian agent reported that five children applied for each vacancy. Near the end of the decade there was a grand total of eighty-five students actually enrolled in two schools. Federal authorities constantly promised to build more facilities but decades of inadequate ones were the rule. At times the degree of administrative bungling was ludicrous. A day school was built but no teacher was provided. As a result, for three years the school building was used

1. Susanna Adella Hayes, *The Resistance to Education for Assimilation by the Colville Indians, 1872 to 1972* (doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973), pp. 8-9 (University Microfilms Order No. 74-3641).

as a warehouse. During many years of failure to provide promised schools, Hayes points out, "the major obstacle to more extensive and improved educational services was attributed to limited financial provisions for buildings, staff, and supplies, rather than the children's inability to learn or parental indifference to education."[2] Over the long period, fewer than one-tenth of Colville children were afforded an opportunity to attend school.

Since federally-built facilities were chronically inadequate, Colville parents sent their children to public schools whenever possible. Often, such schools were located on the reservation but were designed principally for children of whites who worked on the reservation; whites paid the expenses of the public schools. By 1931, the public schools on or near the Colville reservation enrolled a majority of Indian students from the reservation. After 1934, federal funds were channeled to such public schools to cover the cost of Indian students.

Still, Hayes reports, the Indian children are viewed by the public schools as a liability. Teachers are critical of their reluctance to speak up in class. Hayes notes, however, "it is possible for Indian children as young as six and seven years old to spend hours talking together about their experiences in the open country with great animation and enjoyment."[3] High school athletics is the single public arena where Indian skill is acceptable to the white community. In all other respects, Indian children "know the cold stares from whites on the streets and in the stores of towns are signs of disapproval and rejection" and frequently they, themselves, "adopt the name-calling practices of white men and refer to themselves as 'dumb Indians'."

In 1971, some 85 percent of the Colville children attended public schools on or near the reservation. But these are "white men's schools." Faculty, administration, school boards, and fellow students are mainly white. Despite the fact that, according to Hayes, all Colville children speak English when they enter school, they find the environment foreign and inhospitable.

The second historical study, by Wallace Henry Stockman, concerns the Fort Berthold Indians in North Dakota. Three tribes live there, the Mandans, Arikaras, and Hidatsa (Gros Ventres).

Formal relations between the Indians and the federal government began with the Treaty of Fort Laramie, in 1851. During the following fifteen years, Indian parents requested federal authorities to provide schools for their children, but the requests went unanswered. In 1866, a new treaty was signed under which the United States agreed to spend up to $3,000 a year on various Indian matters, including education. Four years later the first school was opened in December. During the following spring, few children returned and the teacher offered a free meal as an inducement to attend. In May, the school was closed down altogether since reservation authorities decided the structure was needed for other purposes. Because, however, the three

2. *Ibid.*, p. 164. 3. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

tribes had not joined the Sioux in their wars during the 1850s and 1860s, they received extra concessions including some jobs.

In 1875, a government school was opened. Instruction was in the native language. But within five years, this attitude had changed. Jacob Kaufman, Indian agent, reported in 1880 that "the English language is taught exclusively in the school, which I believe is the proper language to be taught in an Indian school."[4] Occasionally, Christian missionaries seemed to have a somewhat greater respect for Indian culture. In 1876, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions sent Rev. C. L. Hall and his wife to the reservation. They used the Dakotan language in church services.

Whatever the reason—Stockman does not evince any interest in searching for one—Indian parents became deepy antagonistic to the federal schools. George E. Gerowe, the school superintendent, complained that the Indian parents would gather near the boarding school grounds and he had to drive them away "since they exerted an undue influence over the Indian children."[5] Whenever possible parents withheld their children from such schools. To counteract this action, in 1888 federal Indian authorities in Washington, D.C. ordered the local Indian agent to withhold rations from Indian families until they sent their children to the schools. Five years later Congress passed a law providing: "The Secretary of the Interior may, at his discretion, withhold rations, clothing, and other annuities from Indian parents or guardians who refuse or neglect to send and keep their children in some school a reasonable portion of the year." Two important factors, among others, helped alienate the three tribes from the educational facilities they had demanded in vain for so long. First, was the language of instruction; English was a foreign language and all but useless in the life on the reservation. Second, was the profound unpopularity of boarding schools where Indian children were not only sent far away from home but were subjected to a systematic process of suppression and denigration of Indian culture.

During the early years of the present century, academic goals of Indian education were almost nonexistent. In 1911, for example "the boys were given instruction in gardening and the girls in sewing, cooking, and housework. In the schoolroom of the day [i.e. non-boarding] schools, the classwork was limited to the primary level and few pupils remained in school long enough to complete the fifth grade."[6] By the 1930s the major government drive was to shift Indian children into public schools. The facilities were modest at best. In his report for 1932, Carl M. Moore, supervisor of Indian Education, reported three "new" public schools on the Fort Berthold reservation: "One of these is to be conducted in a worked-over Indian dance hall. Another will be housed in a Catholic chapel and the third in a Mormon church."[7]

4. Quoted in Wallace Henry Stockman, *Historical Perspectives of Federal Educational Promises and Performance Among the Fort Berthold Indians* (doctoral dissertation, University of Colorado, 1972), p. 155. (University Microfilms Order No. 72-25,221).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 161. 6. *Ibid.*, p. 205. 7. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

While Stockman does not supply enough evidence to establish his conclusions firmly, they are consistent with evidence he did examine: "The majority culture has achieved its initial goal—the destruction of the original social forms of the Fort Berthold people."[8] The schools played an important role in that process of destruction.

Teachers

To what extent are teachers in schools educating both Indian and Anglo pupils aware of sociocultural differences between the two groups of children? Joseph J. Centrone set out to answer this question by studying third graders and 222 teachers in fourteen elementary schools.

By and large, the teachers—apparently all Anglo—were assimilative and optimistic about social interraction between Indian and Anglo children. They felt, for example, that the children were adjusting well to each other. But Centrone found that "as the Indian pupil progresses in school, he interacts less with pupils of other ethnic groups."[9] Teachers were confident that Indian pupils were coming to resemble their Anglo classmates in basic beliefs and values. Centrone found the contrary to be the case, at least with respect to several subjects under scrutiny. Thus, instead of Indian parents preferring integrated schools they expressed a desire for an all-Indian school. Teachers thought the two groups of children shared a common conception of citizenship. "Indian children," Centrone discovered, "are taught that they are members of a separate nation."[10] Indeed, writes Centrone, "Indian people, especially those of the Longhouse religion, wish their children to learn the Indian tongue, to fully participate in tribal customs, folkways, mores, and religion, but are not interested in their children's learning and acceptance of the Anglo culture."[11]

Teachers' expressed values seemed to have little effect on their students' academic achievement. The teachers most sensitive to differences between the two cultures had no "substantial bearing" on the reading or arithmetic achievement of their students. This finding can be contrasted to the frequent finding in other studies—especially of white teachers and minority students other than Indians—that students, whose teachers are less prejudiced and more "understanding", tend to be more successful academically.

Two questions, among others, are raised by Centrone's research. First, how capable are teachers when it comes to gauging cultural differences of students when they themselves are part of the dominant community group? Centrone's research is hardly encouraging on this score. Second, what are the practical consequences of cultural understanding? If Centrone's report on parent preferences is accurate,

8. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
9. Joseph John Centrone, Jr., *Teacher Sociocultural Awareness in Selected Schools in New York State Accountable for American Indian Education* (doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, 1972), p. 72 (University Microfilms Order No. 73-9585).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 88. 11. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

the Indian community under study does not wish to be "understood" so much as to be left alone to develop its own cultural ways.

Considerations such as these create a framework of doubt as to the educational significance of more traditional research findings. Donald E. Hjelmseth, for example, studied ninety-five teachers from four public elementary schools near Indian reservations in Montana. He found "very encouraging" the fact that "nearly half . . . of all elementary teachers sampled have had academic course work in Indian studies in the past five years . . ."[12] This trend is national in scope. Does such training merely enable Anglo and other non-Indian teachers to implement more effectively an Anglo-oriented program of instruction—without consulting the educational interests of the Indian community? Or, does the training form a new path to Indian culture, enabling teachers to create effective instructional strategies that fully take into account the goals of the community?

The School and Indian Culture

An anthropologist studying Navajo mothers born between 1940 and 1949 wrote: ". . . One woman reported having been beaten with a rubber hose for speaking Navajo."[13] She had attended a mission school. (One can easily tell what cultural mission the school conceived for itself.) The rubber hose has receded as an instrument of cultural suppression. By no means, however, are Indians of one mind on converting the public school into a place where their own cultural ways are taught.

Among the Hopis, for example, there does indeed seem to be near unanimity on the undesirability of teaching Hopi ways in school. In a three-year study—from May 1970 to July 1973—Murray L. Wax and Robert G. Brennig found that most Hopis regarded the schools "as places where they send their children to learn 'white man's ways'."[14] A fourth-grade teacher told interviewers: "The PTA president said that Hopi culture could not be taught in the schools, that this was something to be done in the village and not at the school. The school was set up to teach white ways and they wanted it kept that way."[15] Since Hopis do not distinguish between their religion and their culture, most consider public discussion of cultural—others might say religious—matters highly inappropriate. On the basis of interviews of 178 parents, Wax and Brennig report: "Although some parents did mention that they would like to see some aspect of Hopi language or culture taught in the school, a majority of mothers volunteered opinions opposed to such activities."[16]

12. Donald E. Hjelmseth, *A Study of Attitudes of Selected Elementary School Teachers Toward American Indian Students in the State of Montana* (doctoral dissertation, University of Montana, 1972, p. 74 (University Microfilms Order No. 72-25,075).
13. Ann Hillyer Rosenthal Metcalf, *The Effects of Boarding School on Navajo Self-Image and Maternal Behavior* (doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1975), p. 110 (University Microfilms Order No. 75-13,558).
14. Murray L. Wax and Robert G. Brennig, *Study of the Community Impact of the Hopi Follow Through Program*, (October 1973), p. 12 (ERIC ED 096 037).
15. *Ibid.*, p. 17 16. *Ibid.*, p. 14

Parents seemed to have drawn a very sharp line between the merits of their traditional culture and the advantages of knowing the white man's ways. Parents, the researchers inform us, believe that "when today's children are adults, virtually no one will be engaged in traditional subsistence activities."[17] Thus, to prepare their children to engage in nontraditional—in effect, in the *white* man's—economy it appears sensible to utilize the white man's schools for the requisite training. As a result, report Wax and Brennig, "in all our visits to PTA meetings on the reservation, we heard nothing of how Hopi children were unique, or that they had particular or peculiar capabilities and potentials that could be utilized in the overall education process [or] personality development of Hopi children."[18] Instead, energetic efforts were underway to "bring everyone up to the 'national average'."[19]

Contrary, then, to expectations of superficial observers, an ethnic group with a rising presence in the schools chose not to convert the school into an ethnic "thing". Instead, it insisted the school perfect its present goals and make them work for Indian children. This approach was freely chosen by Indian parents, although it did not satisfy preconceptions as to how persons of certain ethnic groups should behave.

On the other hand, Dominic J. Cibrario studied four groups of Pueblo Indians and found differing practices with respect to bilingual and bicultural practices.

At Taos Pueblo (New Mexico), a teacher had once tried to initiate such a program but parents protested that they wanted English to be the language of instruction. At the time of Cibrario's study, several years later, a kindergarten teacher observed that the children tended to speak Tiwa less and English more during playtime than four years earlier. This was attributed to greater parental use of English at home and the consequences of a Head Start program. When, however, an English teacher had students write about the San Geronimo Festival, a sacred event, and posted the essays on a bulletin board, the Tribal Council ordered the teacher to remove the essays.

The people of San Juan Pueblo, however, had bilingual instruction in Tewa and English as well as a bicultural program which included Pueblo history. In fact, Spanish is also rather widely used in the community. Cibrario reports that "of the nineteen pueblos in New Mexico, San Juan has thus far been the only pueblo to introduce bilingual and bicultural studies into the elementary school."[20] No explanation is offered as to the uniqueness of San Juan Pueblo.

A different situation exists at Zia Pueblo. "Although the community did not approve of bicultural studies," observes Cibrario, "they wanted to have the Keresan language taught at the school by a

17. *Ibid.*, p. 22
18. *Ibid.*, p. 14 19. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
20. Dominic J. Cibrario, *The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico: An Analysis of the Educational System*, (1974), p. 28 (ERIC ED 096 030).

Keresan Indian aide; however, they did not want an Anglo teacher present in the room while the language instruction was being conducted."[21] So determined were the Zia to maintain the privacy of their culture that they rejected requests of linguists to record the Keresan language. According to Cibrario, "the general attitude seemed to be that the Indians in this attitude would rather see their tribal language perish than allow the ancient language to be recorded by linguists."[22]

At the Zuni Pueblo, no bilingual instruction was given in schools. Young people, who dropped out of school in large numbers, were deeply involved in the Zuni culture by the ease with which they got jobs making jewelry. Since an immediate market existed, a Zuni labor supply was needed.

Chemawa School

Carol J. P. Colfer conducted an ethnographic study of the Chemawa boarding school for Indians in Oregon. During six months in 1971, she was employed as a matron at Chemawa.

The school began in 1880, enrolls students between the ages of 13 and 22, and is surrounded by high fences. Until 1968, military nomenclature was used in many school records. An assignment to do a housekeeping task was described as a "detail", students who were absent without adequate explanation were recorded as "AWOL", and when a student returned from a visit home, a notation might read: "Mary Whitefoot Leave to Duty." Over the years, students tended to come from specific areas or tribes; undoubtedly, this has resulted from official policy. Following is an indication of the predominant tribal attendance pattern since 1880:[23]

1880-1948	Northwest coast and Montana
1948-1961	Navajo
1961-1971	Alaska
1971 to present	Northwest coast

Recently, enrollment ranged between 700 and 1000.

However advanced her academic training, Colfer occupied a very ordinary position at the school. As matron in a dormitory, she was able to glimpse intimate aspects of life which eluded other investigators. It is not intimate events so much as intimate aspects of everyday routines that emerge in Colfer's work.

Alaskan and Northwest students differed in important aspects. As Colfer writes:[24]

> . . . Students from the Northwest have had long experience with the white man, and have frequently come to hate him.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34. 22. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
23. Carol Jean Pierce Colfer, *An Ethnography of Leaderlong Indian School* (doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1974), p. 100 (University Microfilms Order No. 74-15,509); See, also, Dean Baker, "Americanization of the Native American," *Eugene Register-Guard*, February 8, 1976; Lehman L. Brightman, "Chemawa Indian School: A Case Study of Educational Failure," *Journal of Non-white Concerns*, (July 1973), pp. 207-13; and Burton C. Lemmon, *The Historical Development of the Chemawa Indian School* (master's thesis, Oregon State University, 1941). 24. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

> They expect whites to demand subservience, to consider themselves superior, to cheat and lie to Indians. This attitude is quickly transmitted to the less "acculturated" Alaskans who have sometimes known *no* whites.

Students from Alaska tend to be nonaggressive and quiet while Northwest students are outgoing and uninhibited; nearly all of them came to Chemawa "because their local school has expelled them or is about to do so."[25]

The dormitory staff, many of them Indians, have more or less adopted the value judgments of students put forward by the faculty. The latter view students as unprepared, unmotivated, and bored. Such denigration is often expressed outside the classroom. Colfer comments:[26]

> Several Alaskan students were pointed out to me as being "stupid" or "not all there." On closer inspection, it developed that the girls in question simply could not understand what they were being told to do. In Barrow Dorm one hears Eskimo and Aleut as much as English.

Tribal divisions are by no means insurmountable although they play a predominant role in the making of personal friendships.

Alaskan students adapt well to the school while Northwest students resist it. Colfer points out that for neither group, however, is the education they receive there of any significance for the future. "Schooling," she writes, "is a hardship that Alaskans as conquered people must undergo, but at the end of the ordeal a return to the familiar, secure (emotionally, if not economically), loving homelife is envisioned."[27] Attendance at Chemawa is for many students a commitment to change their traditional way of life. Academically, however, the experience is seriously inadequate and is the end of the road for virtually all the students.

School as an avenue of upward social mobility is an uncongenial idea to many Chemawa students. Indeed, the very idea of a class society finds little precedent in Indian lives. Colfer explains:[28]

> . . . Most students . . . are from societies where there has not been a great institutionalized discrepancy in status and wealth among individuals, either in the past or the present . . . The student, who is not accustomed to ranking human beings in hierarchies where one human being has a wide latitude of control over another human being *for no apparent reason*, is confused by this strange set of behaviors. He repeatedly sees staff members who are incompetent, in the eyes of both students and other staff members, in positions of authority over adequate or even superb human beings; and these inferior beings remain in positions of authority.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 101. 26. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 135 (emphasis in original).

Hierarchy in the home community was a familiar fact but there it rested on palpable factors such as age, expert knowledge, or a degree of community consent.

Indians were well aware of their own low position in the national class structure. Colfer stresses, however, that the Indian's status "is not a particularly significant part of his own self-concept (though it is of extreme significance in his life)."[29] At Chemawa, the student is constantly reminded by his daily experience of the very low status he occupies: ". . . The student is seen by staff members as being the lowest in the hierarchy and is treated accordingly."[30] (The process whereby the student comes to accept the lowest social position for himself is not documented in Colfer's study, nor, perhaps, anywhere else.)

The comparatively few who succeed at Chemawa are not the special objects of appreciation or respect by the rest. For most students at Chemawa, the school year is more a nine months' captivity than anything else.[31]

Since ethnographic studies such as Colfer's are not plentiful, few schools, Indian and non-Indian, have been the object of careful probing into the homely details of school life. Yet, some comparisons come to mind. The norm of little academic achievement is found in many large-city schools attended by poor and minority children, some of them Indians. In a perceptive study of New York City schools, Miriam Wasserman wrote that in those schools the parent was considered "the least adult" and students were "the least persons."[32] The lesson of learning one's "place" in an inhospitable class structure was mastered all too well in such schools. And, as at Chemawa, there was little or no evidence of a connection between schooling and later upward social mobility.

Urban Indians

Two studies of Indians in Detroit, completed three years apart, are available.

Thomas E. Glass, author of the earlier study, used data collected by a previous public opinion survey. In the Cass Corridor, a part of the city that attracts very poor people, unemployment among heads of Indian families stood at forty-six percent. Most of the parents had attended federal Indian schools or public schools on or near a reservation. When asked what they thought of the Detroit public schools, many failed to answer. Glass explains: ". . . For every ten months of school the Indian child usually only makes five months of academic progress . . . Children have traded non-achievement in rural schools for non-achievement in urban schools."[33] This conclusion

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33. 30. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 44
32. Miriam Wasserman, *The School Fix, NYC, USA* (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1970), p. 57.
33. Thomas Eugene Glass, *A Descriptive and Comparative Study of American Indian Children in the Detroit Public Schools* (doctoral dissertation, Wayne State University, 1972), pp. 238, 241 (University Microfilms Order No. 72-28,436).

is based on examination of test data. Apparently, Ross did not visit any schools to observe the classroom aspects of this non-achievement.

The second Detroit study was done by Beatrice A. Bigony; field work was conducted between fall 1971 and spring 1973. She worked through the Associated Indians of Detroit, primarily in the Cass Corridor. Unlike Ross, Bigony spoke with many Cass people.

"Many Indian people in the Cass Corridor," Bigony found, "eat only one meal a day. Adults appear to survive principally on cups of coffee, doctored with sugar and powdered cream, and cigarettes."[34] Most do not have telephones. Their children's high rate of absence from school is another reflection of their poverty:[35]

> Their children are teased at school because they are Indians and because they wear faded or old clothing. To save the children from this embarrassment some of the parents deliberately keep their children out of school part time.

Few of these parents see much point in their children finishing high school; there is little opportunity awaiting them afterwards.

Many of the Indian people in Cass Corridor share a prevailing attitude described by Bigony as follows:[36]

> This is a general feeling of despair, of somehow being cheated out of the best years of life without knowing why. This feeling of despair is coupled with frustration because the people do not know how to make life change for the better.

Yet, Bigony observes that "it is the people from this neighborhood who have spearheaded fights for change among the Indian populace of Detroit."[37] (No explanation is offered of the emergence of a force for change out of a general context of despair.)

While nearly all Indian parents in the Cass Corridor had grown up on reservations, few consciously transmitted their cultural heritage. Bigony reports that "most people of the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi tribes do not know their specific traditional beliefs, they do not know their folklore, and they do not know their language . . ."[38] Solidarity among Indians who are economically self-sustaining is weakening. Many, Bigony writes, are "refusing to acknowledge obligations to their kin, who act as drains on their financial resources."[39]

Bigony explored varying Indian attitudes toward education and the city schools. In general, high dropout rates were associated with low levels of parental education and unstable employment. Those parents who worked at low-paying jobs tended to find more to criticize in the schools. (One exception was criticism from parents who were employed as professionals.) The two major school problems

34. Beatrice Anne Bigony, *Migrants to the Cities: A Study of the Socioeconomic Status of Native Americans in Detroit and Michigan* (doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974), p. 147, footnote 8. (University Microfilms Order No. 76-5548).
35. *Ibid.*, p.133.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 149. 37. *Ibid.*, p. 150. 38. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

reported by a broad range of parents were discrimination by teachers and prejudiced behavior by non-Indian classmates. Skilled workers tended to be less critical of schools than were unskilled workers. Since Bigony did not investigate actual discrimination in the schools, it is impossible to know how realistic the parent attitudes are.

Eskimos make up 2.1 percent of the population of greater Anchorage, Alaska. It is this group of people that Patrick J. Dubbs studied. Actually, his sample included nearly three-quarters of all Anchorage Eskimos twenty years of age and older.

At the time of the study, the unemployment rate for Eskimo workers was 38.1 percent, some four times greater than the rate for Anchorage as a whole. While a high school diploma is nearly always expected of an applicant for a job, 56.5 percent of the Eskimos haven't finished high school. "Although there are many able Anchorage Eskimos with a vast amount of experiential knowledge," Dubbs writes, "these individuals are often denied employment because they lack a certain credential."[40]

Since all Eskimos in Anchorage are bilingual, one might expect that they would interact a good deal with persons of other ethnic backgrounds. Whether because of employment or for other reasons, the greatest amount of interaction occurs between Eskimos and whites, considerably less with Indians, and almost none with blacks. There is a considerable amount of Eskimo-white intermarriage but it almost always involves an Eskimo woman and a white man.

Living in Anchorage takes its toll of traditional kinship relations. "Many Eskimos, although not the majority," reports Dubbs, "take great pains not to have their addresses or phone numbers made public so as to avoid having to fulfill kinship obligations and suffer the attendant personal and economic consequences."[41]

Anchorage Eskimos are what Dubbs calls "reliable employees." Only about one-fourteenth live on nonwage income such as welfare or child support funds. While they suffer much employment discrimination, they are often hesitant about making a formal complaint to a government bureau: "This reluctance stems from a fear of being rejected and a feeling that the black or Caucasian administrative agent will not be interested in a Native claim."[42]

Dubbs sees the Anchorage Eskimos as outsiders. ". . . Many, if not most, Anchorage Eskimos are balanced," he writes, "on the edge of a precipice—they are isolated, they have a low level of adaptation, they are not receiving support from agencies and they are developing serious drinking problems."[43] The source of the problems, Dubbs emphasizes, lies not in the Eskimo but in the larger social system of Anchorage and beyond.

40. Patrick James Dubbs, *The Urban Adaptation Patterns of Alaska Eskimos in Anchorage, Alaska* (doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1975), p. 106. (University Microfilms Order No. 76-5548).
41. *Ibid.*, p. 88. 42. *Ibid.*, p. 223. 43. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

Federal Policy

In 1864 a formal treaty was signed between the Klamath Indian tribe and the federal government. The economic resources owned by the tribe—timber, range land, pulpwood—were held in trust and managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Outside users of these resources paid fees and royalties to BIA which then distributed part of the proceeds to each member of the tribe.

The per capita payments were interpreted by many outsiders as government largesse, but such an interpretation was quite mistaken. As William T. Trulove, the author of the study under review, explains:[44]

> . . . Since 1918, the Klamath were never a "burden" on taxpayers. From tribal income they paid for most BIA administration, forest and range management, extension services, health, welfare, law and order, and various credit schemes either directly from timber revenues or, in the case of loans, from obligated future revenues.

In 1923, it was estimated that four out of five able-bodied Klamath were self-supporting, i.e., earned an income, over and above the per capita payments.

Paternalism was (and remains) the operating principle of federal Indian policy. As trustee for Klamath property, BIA performed as the all-knowing father. It alone made final decisions on important economic issues. For example, it concentrated on preserving the value of Klamath resources but "few serious attempts were made to encourage or develop Indian owned and operating manufacturing facilities."[45] Trulove points out the bureaucratic reasons for this policy:[46]

> First, developmental and industrial activities were risky. Indians might fail and under BIA direction that would be equivalent to BIA failure. Careers would be jeopardized and claims might be lodged against the government which would lower the BIA's status with Congress.

Individual Klamath were all but excluded from management responsibilities in BIA enterprises.

The exclusion of Klamath from self-directed economic activity could not help but underscore the importance of per capita payments. By the early 1950s, it was estimated that "only 35 percent of all Klamath families were able to make a living without per capitas."[47] As its salience grew, the per capita system came to influence many aspects of Klamath society, both on and off the reservation. An example of the latter was the growing practice of Klamath obtaining credit from nearby merchants by mortgaging their future per capita

44. William Thomas Trulove, *Economics of Paternalism: Federal Policy and the Klamath Indians* (doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 1973), p. 172. (University Microfilms Order No. 74-12,965). 45. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 102. 47. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

payments. Trulove comments that "area businessmen, while criticizing social effects of the system, consistently pressed for its continuation."[48]

In his study, Trulove frequently characterizes per capita payments as "unearned income" and then traces the harmful effect of such payments on their recipients. He refers often to these effects as depriving Klamath adults and young persons of personal incentives to work and study. From another perspective, however, it could be stressed that the per capita payments were *not designed* as rewards for individual enterprise. Children, for instance, were entitled to full payments because of their tribal membership and not because of productive work. As indicated above, a half-century ago the Klamath were predominantly self-supporting despite the per capita system. One *earned* per capita by *being* Klamath. But one *made a living* by participating in the *white* economy. As the latter became more difficult, the inadequacy of per capita payments became more obvious.

Given the framework of federal paternalism and narrowing employment opportunities, the per capita system proved destructive to the Klamath.

It became a common practice for parents to borrow from children's per capita accounts in order to cover various expenses. "As parents sank more deeply in debt to their children," writes Trulove, "and with little hope of repayment, they found their parental influence severely restricted."[49] Klamath youth found themselves poorly prepared to compete for jobs in the outside economy because their schooling was inadequate. According to Trulove, "the Klamath were generally unconvinced as to the importance of education and local schools provided little room for enthusiasm."[50] This had not been the case a half-century earlier when, Trulove writes, the rate of school attendance for Klamath children was higher than the national average. During 1938-1947, non-Klamath taxpayers in the county paid about three-fifths of the cost of the education of Klamath children; the rest was supplied by the federal government. "Klamath county schools had no incentive to provide special services to meet Indian needs, and, in fact, had to resist strong incentives to discourage Klamath attendance," Trulove reports.[51]

In 1954, Congress, responding to non-Indian pressures, enacted a law permitting the federal government to "terminate" Indian reservations and convert all tribally-owned assets into individual property. Termination, as Trulove explains clearly, "was specifically aimed at ending federally controlled Indian reservations and thereby eliminating all special rights and privileges granted when the reservation was originally created."[52] Seven years later, the Klamath reservation was "terminated."

48. *Ibid.*, p. 122. 49. *Ibid.*, p. 123. 50. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35. 52. *Ibid.*, p. 156

Under congressional pressure, the BIA negotiated sale of the Klamath forest for a final price one-quarter less than originally offered. Formally, the sales revenue was to yield a per capita payment of $43,000; only a third (34 percent) of the tribe actually received this amount "free and clear." In April 1961 the cash distribution was made. For the most part, Klamath used their shares for "domestic needs such as living and medical expenses, automobiles, home improvements, household furnishing, and housing."[53] For the first time in their lives, Indians needed to employ lawyers to aid them in unfamiliar transactions. The Klamath County Bar Association took advantage of the situation by promulgating a fee schedule which charged Indians twice the fee that non-Indians paid.[54] (Trulove is contradictory in the speed with which the Klamath spent their funds. In one place he writes that "about half used their funds fairly rapidly" and in another that "most proceeds were probably disposed of fairly rapidly."[55])

Writing about a dozen years after termination, Trulove noted that the position of the Indians in local society was virtually unchanged. Klamath were not "flooding" the welfare rolls as many whites had expected. Patterns of residence and employment had not changed. Thus, "the pro rata shares were usually exhausted as the Klamath adjusted their style of life, but not the incomes, upward."[56]

Governmental paternalism until termination proved a disabling rather than an enabling policy for the Klamath. Termination itself was the ultimate in paternalistic decision-making. It did not convert the supporting Klamath into the self-regarding entrepreneur so dear to American myth. Instead, it integrated him into a class society in which he could take his place—a very lowly one—and function as dependent poor.

In 1963 the BIA pledged to close the educational gap between Indian and non-Indian students in seven years. In 1972 the U.S. General Accounting Office reviewed the pledge and found that not only was the goal far from being achieved, but the BIA had made no real preparation to achieve it.[57] In 1976 GAO undertook another probe that found:[58]

> As was the case at the time of our 1972 report, we did not find evidence that BIA had established realistic goals and objectives or implemented comprehensive programs to meet the needs of Indian students. As a result, the major national goal established by the Congress to provide the quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities which will permit Indian children to compete in the careers of their choice is no nearer to being achieved than it was four years ago.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 236, 242.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
57. See Meyer Weinberg, *A Chance to Learn* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 228-29.
58. General Accounting Office, *Concerted Efforts Needed to Improve Indian Education* (Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General of the United States, January 17, 1977), p. 19.

GAO also noted that from 1966 to 1976, fifteen different persons served as Director or Assistant Director in the BIA's Office of Indian Education Programs. The average term was seven months.

If a new day in Indian education is dawning, the researchers have yet to glimpse it. The historical works document the persistence of deeply-rooted patterns of subordination as well as inadequate and misdirected education. While certain quantitative progress is evident —more children in school—the inadequacy has eased little.

Contemporary school reform hinges much on teacher training and retraining. This emphasis is especially prominent in discussions of the teaching of ethnic minority children. The Centrone research must give pause to these efforts. In searching for evidence of educational benefits to children of increasingly enlightened teachers, Centrone met with considerable disappointment. It is not that cultural understanding is unimportant. Rather, the cultural sphere lies beyond the realm of mere book knowledge and must encompass knowledge of specific children living in concrete situations different from those familiar to most teachers.

Researchers who explore the school and Indian culture lead the reader to this conclusion: Indian parents, *to the degree that they trust the school*, favor school responsibility for teaching about Indian culture. If efforts by Indian parents to achieve greater control over schools meet with success, the schools will be assigned greater cultural responsibilities.

The study of Chemawa must be measured against less extensive and less formal studies. In general, Chemawa does not seem exceptional in any major sense. In autobiographical accounts written by Indians who attended boarding schools, one finds many of the same phenomena. Reading Colfer's study is a very welcome relief from many recent studies of Indian education that depend upon questionnaires and demographic data.

Whether in Detroit or Anchorage, Indians occupy the lowest level of urban society. Unfortunately, in neither of the studies examined here was any attention paid to the conditions of Indian schooling in the schools actually attended. These conditions are very distant from the treatment of other poor or minority children. Not only is there educational deprivation but cultural oppression and discrimination of unique gravity.

Trulove's study of the Klamath is especially strong in analyzing the strategy and content of the termination policy. (Unfortunately, he does not note the deleterious effects of termination of education.[59]) He is also helpful in enabling the reader to understand the federal bureaucratic framework which surrounds Indian life. This, in turn, clarifies why the contemporary Indian American movement for self-determination necessarily concentrates on the character of future federal regulation.

59. See Weinberg, *A Chance to Learn*, p. 224.

Desegregation and the Movement of People

The remainder of this issue is devoted to a discussion of recent research bearing on the interrelationship of desegregation and the movement of people, mainly students. First, we will review studies covering two states, three cities, and one county. Second, we will examine a study of segregation in suburbs. And finally, we will bring up to date the general argument about desegregation and white flight.

Six Places

Jefferson County

James A. Johnson and associates studied the effect of court-ordered desegregation on enrollment and residential patterns in Louisville and the rest of Jefferson County. Late in 1973, a federal appeals court found the school districts of the city and the county—they were later merged into a single county district—guilty of deliberately segregating children by race. In September 1975, the desegregation plan began. What were its effects?

White enrollment in the schools had fallen even before desegregation. Between September 1970 and September 1976, it dropped 29,155, After the appeals court decision, the exit of white students accelerated. Where did they go? Mostly to the parochial schools whose enrollment had dropped sharply between 1966 to 1973. It began rising in 1974 and increased even more the next year when public school desegregation began. Johnson calculates that "the nonpublic schools had 2,308 more white students enrolled in 1974-75 and 8,248 more in 1975-76 than would have been enrolled had the desegregation events of 1974 and 1975 not occurred."[1] In relation to total 1975-1976 enrollment of 118,505, Johnson regards these losses as "small". Another point is that most of the parochial school gains were located in county rather than city schools. In 1976-1977, the rate of transfers to parochial schools fell significantly.

How many white students did the desegregated system lose as a result of families moving to another school district? Johnson found, somewhat unexpectedly:[2]

> . . . The number of white students lost to the Jefferson County School District due to residential moves outside the county was

1. James A. Johnson, Jr., *The Impact of Court Ordered Desegregation on Student Enrollment and Residential Patterns in the Jefferson County, Kentucky Public School District. An Interim Report* (Louisville: Jefferson County Education Consortium, May 31, 1977), p. 49.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 79.

between zero and 540 students in 1975-76, the first year of court-ordered desegregation. While there are white families that will say . . . they . . . moved out of Jefferson County to avoid busing, because they were replaced by other [white] families, this movement has not noticeably affected white enrollment in the school system.

White flight in a residential sense was negligible since it did not result in resegregation. (The crucial consideration in residential desegregation is whether whites, especially those with school-age children, continue to move into an area, along with blacks.) [3]

Johnson also found indications that residential desegregation had increased somewhat within the district. This could be seen from an increase in the number of non-bused whites in formerly black schools. In order to walk to school they had to live nearby. The number of non-bused blacks attending formerly white schools also increased. While Johnson does not say this, it is possible that before desegregation both groups of students lived where they now do but, under discriminatory school assignments, attended segregated schools. He did find that few white parents took advantage of a provision in the court order establishing exempt schools. These were schools located in areas of integrated housing whose schools, already desegregated, were exempted from busing. It had been thought that this possibility would attract whites but it did not. (Other cities such as Omaha have used such a mechanism but it is not known whether it worked out any differently in these places.)

White parents were found to have avoided enrolling their children in formerly black schools which still enrolled large numbers of black students. "Actual black enrollment," Johnson writes, "has a greater effect on whether white students enrolled in schools than actual white enrollment had on black students enrolling in schools."[4] Indeed, the ease with which white parents were able to avoid certain schools was largely a consequence of school board action. (Early in 1977, the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights found a number of schools segregated, in apparent violation of the federal court order.[5])

Johnson points out that his conclusions are "very tentative" and "preliminary." Overall, he found extremely little evidence of white flight, that is, a headlong exit of uncommonly large numbers of whites as a consequence of court-ordered desegregation. On the issue of busing, after interviewing 410 persons who had moved out of the county, he found that "the distance bused, that is the distance between the students' homes and the schools to which they are bused did not contribute substantially to the loss of white students in Jefferson County."[6] Given the national media's sensationalized and distorted portrayal of desegregation in Jefferson County, perhaps this finding is most surprising of all.

3. See Norman M. Bradburn, Seymour Sudman, and Galen L. Gockel, *Side by Side: Integrated Neighborhoods in America* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971).
4. Johnson, *The Impact of Court-Ordered Desegregation*, pp. 81-82.
5. Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, *Vestiges of Segregation Remain in Jefferson County Schools* (Louisville: The Commission, February 1977).
6. Johnson, *The Impact of Court Ordered Desegregation*, p. viii.

Illinois

The Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC) was employed by the Illinois Office of Education to study racially-mixed schools in the state during the period 1971-1974. Such schools were defined as facilities enrolling more than 10 percent but not over 90 percent minority students. This is a very elastic standard. A number of the schools classified by RERC as racially stable were classified as segregated under the official state desegregation guidelines.[7] Nevertheless, the study is significant because it is the first such study on a state-wide basis and it contains much data bearing on issues relevant to desegregation.

RERC found 741 schools in the state that satisfied its definition of racially-mixed schools. The following table summarizes several features of the schools.[8] Figures in parentheses are decreases.

Number of Schools	Minority Enrollment trend	Change in percent minority, 1971-1974 (increase or decrease in percentage points)	Percent of total
3	Declining	(20) or more	0.4
13	Nominally stable/ declining	(10) to (20)	1.8
479	Stable	(10) to 10	64.6
172	Nominally stable/ increasing	10 to 20	23.2
43	Increasing	20 to 30	5.8
31	Rapidly increasing	30 to 40	4.2
741			100.0

Only one-third of the schools show an increasing trend in minority enrollment.

RERC was able to test the tipping-point hypothesis against its Illinois data. This hypothesis is that after a certain percentage of minority students is reached, whites leave in very great numbers, as though a once-level surface were "tipped." That tipping-point is usually considered to be around thirty percent. The Illinois data, however, did not support the hypothesis:[9]

> Schools enrolling from 30 percent up to 50 percent minority pupils in 1971 did not change at a rate significantly greater than schools starting with smaller minority proportions. In fact schools with less than 10 percent minority pupils in 1971 increased their minority pupil proportion at a faster rate than

7. The state guidelines define a segregated school as one whose enrollment deviates more or less than fifteen percent from the racial-ethnic composition of the school district as a whole.
8. Real Estate Research Corporation, *Stability of Racial Mix in Illinois Schools* (Chicago: Real Estate Research Corporation, April 1976), p. 35. Arithmetical errors have been corrected. A summary of the study is in Deborah Brett, "Stability of Racial Mix in Illinois' Integrated Schools." *Integrateducation*, 15 (March-April 1977), pp. 3-8.
9. RERC, *Stability of Racial Mix in Illinois Schools*, p. 38.

> schools in the 30 to 50 percent group . . . Most schools where whites were already numerical minorities in 1971 did not resegregate by 1974.

RERC examined 102 schools that had been more than 60 percent nonwhite in 1971. Thirty-three of these schools had resegregated by 1974, i.e., they were over 90 percent nonwhite. In another twenty schools which had been over 60 percent nonwhite, by 1974 the proportion white had increased. Thus, concludes RERC, "rapid resegregation in schools where whites are numerical minorities is . . . by no means inevitable."[10]

Many of the schools that did resegregate were located in districts which are majority nonwhite or nearly so. They were located in two cities—Chicago and East St. Louis— and their older suburbs, one of which has a virtually all-black residential section. RERC suggests that racial change in these schools is related to the racial composition of the school district as a whole rather than to a single school's so-called "tipping point." (A similar conclusion was reached by Luther Munford in a study of Mississippi.[11])

RERC also selected a sample of forty racially-stable schools for more intensive study. In each of the communities visited, interviewers talked to the superintendent, two board members (one white and one minority), the principal, two parents, the student body president, and a local realtor. Ten were in Chicago, twelve elsewhere in the city's metropolitan area, and eighteen downstate. In only eleven of the schools were any students bused for desegregation. The racial stability of these schools was highlighted by the fact that racial diversity persisted even though most of the schools experienced declining enrollments during 1971-1974. Most of the schools were desegregated by other than deliberate (mandatory or voluntary) means. (RERC uses the term "accidental desegregation" but since desegregation has rarely been blundered into by American schools, the word is not very appropriate. "Unplanned" would seem to be more accurate.) Interestingly, RERC found that "the vast majority of schools exhibiting 'accidental' racial mix are in low and/or moderate income neighborhoods . . ."[12] Further study of the educational and other experiences of students in these schools might contribute to a reconsideration of the unfortunate postulate in American educational research that school desegregation of lower-income children is bound to be unproductive.

Deborah Brett, who directed the RERC study, comments on certain aspects of the study that emerged from the community interviews:[13]

> The experience of the Illinois schools we visited indicates that racially-mixed schools can "work." That is, pupils can attend school in an atmosphere free of hostility or violence, while bene-

10. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
11. See Luther Munford, "White Flight from Desegregation in Mississippi," *Integrateducation*, 11 (May-June 1973), pp. 12-26.
12. RERC, *Stability of Racial Mix in Illinois Schools*, p. 73.
13. Brett, "Stability of Racial Mix in Illinois' Integrated Schools," p. 8.

fiting from formal classroom and friendship contacts among diverse groups . . . The consensus of school administrators, board members, and parents was that learning progress was not hampered in a racially-mixed classroom and in some cases was improved.

It is, of course, just these qualitative aspects of desegregation that are relatively little studied.

Kansas City

Daniel U. Levine and Jeanie K. Meyer studied desegregation and white enrollment in Kansas City during the years 1956-1975. Included in the research were seventy-five elementary schools which had operated during part or all the period. None of the schools had been deliberately desegregated and in this respect they resemble the Illinois schools studied by RERC.

While no universal tipping point was found, the researchers concluded that "white enrollment decline has tended to accelerate in schools with a relatively high percentage of black students (above about thirty percent) and/or a recent rapid increase in the percentage of black students."[14] Schools between 30 and 60 percent black tended to become virtually all-black in a few years. Both these findings were contradicted by findings in the Illinois study.

Levine and Meyer observe "the difficulties of analyses mixing school districts which differ greatly in characteristics such as neighborhood housing patterns, thus suggesting the desirability of conducting longitudinal case studies of change in racial composition at the building level in individual districts."[15] Housing may, in fact, be a key to understanding patterns of school racial change in cases of unplanned desegregation as in the Kansas City and Illinois studies. In the absence of legal compulsion embodied in a court order or a strong school district policy on behalf of desegregation—both conditions were absent during the years of study in Illinois and Kansas City—the schools are at the mercy of residential segregation. Through a combination of real estate industry action and individual home-owner policy, community racial patterns, including the schools, are fairly predictable.

Alexandria

A very short report from the Alexandria, Virginia public schools contains an item of interest, reminiscent somewhat of the Jefferson County experience. Denis A. Leone writes: "School statistics show that while 227 students left the public school system for private schools during the summer months [of 1974], 248 new students entered the public school system from private schools."[16]

14. Daniel U. Levine and Jeanie K. Meyer, *Level and Rate of Desegregation and White Enrollment Decline in a Big City School District* (Kansas City: University of Missouri, May 1976), p. 18. 15. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
16. Dennis A. Leone, "White Flight in Alexandria," *Integrateducation*, 13 (March-April 1975), p. 40.

A number of the "new" students were actually returning to Alexandria after having left a year or so earlier. Leone also conducted a public opinion survey of 937 parents and guardians of children who had left the Alexandria schools. Since only 474 or 50.6 percent replied, the results are not very representative. Yet, it is of some interest to note that only one-sixth of the respondents whose children were then attending private schools gave busing or desegregation as the reason for withdrawing their children from public schools.

Florida

By far the most extensive study has been made by Micheal [sic] W. Giles, Douglas S. Gatlin, and Everett F. Cataldo under sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. Responses to desegregation were studied in seven metropolitan school districts: Dade, Duval, Escambia, Lee, Leon, Manatee, and Palm Beach. Nearly 3,400 parents were interviewed. Among whites in the sample, 2,112 were compliers and 1,286 rejecters. The latter were parents who withdrew their child (ren) after one year in a desegregated school.

From the beginning of the 1971-1972 school year until the close of the 1972-1973 school year, 96.4 percent of all parents complied. Only 3.6 percent rejected desegregation after one year. The researchers checked after that to determine what happened to those students who transferred to private schools during 1973-1974. It was found that nearly one-quarter (24 percent), not only of the transferees but of all private school students, returned to public schools in September 1973. And in Duval County, 37 percent of all private students returned; in Lee County 10 percent returned. Parents of the returnees cited three specific reasons that convinced them to return:[17]

Financial	25 percent
Child's request	19 percent
Distance (nearer)	12 percent
Other	44 percent
	100 percent

The parents of returnees were slightly better off financially than the parents of children who remained in private schools. Also, many of the schools which returnees entered had a lower percentage of black students than a year before. Presumably, this feature made the school more acceptable.

The researchers explored numerous aspects of the desegregation experience in Florida. Readers are urged to consult the complete report for these materials. Here we will merely touch on several of those aspects.

A sharp distinction is drawn between protesters and rejecters. Many of the parents who complied did so under protest. The researchers, however, declare: "... Protest is not a precursor to rejection.

17. Micheal W. Giles, Douglas S. Gatlin, and Everett F. Cataldo, *Determinants of Desegregation: Compliance/Rejection Behavior and Policy Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, June 1976), IX-5.

This year's protester is no more likely than the quiescent complier to become next year's rejecter."[18] Black and white compliers were asked how they felt about the way desegregation had been handled in their area. Here are their replies, stated in percentages:[19]

	Black Compliers (N — 1,049)	White Compliers (N — 2,109)
Approve strongly	9.3	2.2
Approve	46.3	21.6
Neither approve nor disapprove	17.7	15.8
Disapprove	18.4	29.9
Disapprove strongly	8.0	30.3
Don't know; not sure	0.3	0.2
Number of respondents	100.0	100.0

It should be noted that all the respondents complied even though a quarter of the blacks and three-fifths of the whites disapproved. Findings like these led the Giles group to observe: ". . . The authors can think of no other area [of social science research] where reliance on attitudinal studies has proven more misleading."[20] This comment would seem to apply with special force to situations where desegregation is only prospective. Under such conditions, an opinion about the future may need to be discounted significantly.

Considerable attention was paid to the possible existence of a tipping point. In the sense of a fixed percentage which, if exceeded, produced white flight from a school or district, they found no tipping point. They did, however, discover a "threshold effect" that operated under varying conditions. Tipping and threshold are very different concepts. Tipping envisions a sudden flood of blacks in and whites out. Nothing of the sort happened in Florida—a state by the way which is more urban than Pennsylvania.

The researchers found when the percent black in a school remained under 30 percent, the number of rejecters was low. When the percent went beyond that level, the number of rejecters increased. Interestingly, however, the rate of rejecting was no higher in a 50 percent black school. While it is true that the vast majority of whites were not put off from attending schools with appreciable numbers of black students, there is no denying the existence of this socio-psychological barrier for a small group of whites. Giles and his associates recommend that school planners pay attention to this fact.

Given the national debate over busing, it is noteworthy that the researchers found "those bused are only slightly more likely to reject than those not bused."[21] Analysis of attitudes on busing revealed that "busing is a source of white parental disapproval not so much for its own sake as because it tends to place the white child in a more heavily black school."[22]

18. *Ibid.*, p. iv. 19. *Ibid.*, viii-3. 20. *Ibid.*, iv-18.
21. *Ibid.*, v-3. 22. *Ibid.*, viii-15.

Both black and white parents regarded educational advantages for their children as crucial. "Parents' reactions to desegregation," write the researchers, "are intertwined with their concerns about the quality of education offered in the public schools and the ability of the schools to provide a safe and orderly learning environment."[23]

All Florida school districts are county-wide. Dade County includes the schools of Miami; Duval County includes the schools of Jacksonville; and so on. As a result, parents living in a large city in Florida cannot find a white suburb to move to although they can certainly send their children to private schools. The relatively small amount of rejection is closely related to the existence of metropolitan school districts. Yet, one should not claim too much for metropolitan districts. It is possible to find many individual schools in such districts that are very nearly segregated, sometimes in violation of a court order. This seems to be the case in Jefferson County, Kentucky, another metropolitan district. In addition, a number of single-city school districts are more thoroughly desegregated than some metropolitan districts.

Boston

Since, regrettably, it is standard procedure in the United States to depend on the mass media for information on desegregation problems, even learned discourse on Boston is mired in a swamp of misinformation and distortion. Let us attempt to extract sufficient factual information to answer two questions about that city. First, how has desegregation affected white enrollment? Second, has resegregation occurred because of changes in white enrollment?

There is disagreement as to the magnitude of white loss since desegregation. James S. Coleman reports a loss of 16 percent of all white students in 1974 and 19 percent in 1975.[24] Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green held that the more correct figure for 1974 was 14.4 percent.[25] David J. Armor contends the actual percentage losses for three years of Boston desegregation are: 14.9, 20.5, and 10.6 percent.[26] Christine H. Rossell gives her estimate of maximum white loss due to desegregation as:[27]

Fall 1974	4,879
Fall 1975	4,852
Fall 1976	200
	9,931

23. *Ibid.*, x-7.
24. James S. Coleman, *Presentation on School Desegregation and White Flight*, paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, September 1, 1976, p. 5.
25. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green, "A Reply to Professor Coleman," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 46 No. 2 (May 1976), p. 233, footnote 13.
26. David J. Armor, "Offer of Proof in Reference To the Testimony of David J. Armor," in *Crawford* v. *Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles*, Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, No. C822 854, June 6, 1977, Exhibit C, p. 5.
27. Christine H. Rossell, "Boston's Desegregation and White Flight," *Integrateducation*, 15 (January-February 1977), p. 38.

Armor implies that the loss is over 16,500.[28] Both Rossell's and Armor's absolute figures express the loss of white students over and above expected losses due to drop in birth rates and other factors.

All agree that the onset of desegregation in Boston set off an increase in white departures from the public schools. The estimates by percentages are not greatly disparate. The estimates in absolute numbers vary by somewhere around 6,500 students. Rossell holds that a truer figure for white loss is 5,000 rather than nearly 10,000 reported above. However, the sole basis of this low estimate appears to be a suspicion by Robert Dentler that city school authorities had been inflating the number of white students until 1975. Thus, part of the white loss was merely a realistic scaling down of an incorrect figure. If this were so, the 5,000 white loss would be very small indeed. In the absence of independent verification, one can only suspend judgment.

In the face of a white loss in the neighborhood of 5,000-16,500 and a negligible loss of blacks, it would seem obvious that Boston would have been resegregated. Yet, this does not seem to have happened.

A standard measure of segregation is the Taeuber index. It expresses the degree to which part of a system reflects the racial composition of the whole system and is frequently applied to schools. Suppose a school system is half black and half white. If each school has the same proportions, the Taeuber index number is 0.0. If, on the other hand, all blacks and whites attend racially separate schools, the number is 1.0. A problem with this index is that a one-race school system will show up as perfectly balanced – i.e., each school will reflect the racial composition of the entire district.

To remedy this shortcoming, Coleman has constructed an index that takes into account any declining proportion of white students. Essentially, the Coleman index expresses the degree of probability that a black child will have a white schoolmate. Clearly, the Taeuber index could be quite low if a school system were racially balanced or nearly so, while the Coleman index might suggest that the two races are less likely to attend the same school. An all-black (or white) school system would be perfectly balanced but there could be no racial interaction since no student of the other race would be in any school.

How does all this apply to Boston? Only one study of the degree of racial segregation has seen the light of day, that done by Rossell.

She found that the indices were negatively correlated at –.90, an exceedingly high figure. In other words, they moved in almost completely opposite directions. This meant that the more racially balanced the schools, the greater likelihood that children of both races would attend the same school. Here is a listing of each index number for the period 1967-1976:[29]

28. Armor, "Offer of Proof," Exhibit C, p. 5.
29. Christine Rossell to Meyer Weinberg, May 11, 1977.

	Coleman Index S (WB)	Taeuber Index
1967	.324	70.2
1968	.274	72.8
1969	.225	74.2
1970	.231	75.1
1971	.211	76.1
1972	.218	73.5
1973	.209	72.4
1974	.327	50.2
1975	.399	26.9
1976	.381	26.7

(With the Coleman index, the higher the value, the greater the probability that blacks will have white school mates.)

Thus, according to Rossell, Boston's desegregation program has not led to resegregation. Instead, it now has among the lowest degrees of segregation of any large city in the country. Further, the system as a whole is relatively stable since white enrollment fell only slightly during 1976, the third year of desegregation.

But how is it possible for a system to lose large numbers of white students and still avoid resegregation? One answer may be that the court supervised implementation very closely so as to avoid resegregation. This kind of explanation is plausible; the federal district court in Boston seems to have been more vigilant than that in Louisville. Still, an inspection of fifty-eight Boston schools in 1976 found forty-six to be out of compliance with court-established guidelines. A number of the violations, however, were marginal while those in Louisville were far more serious.[30]

Another explanation is offered by Rossell, viz., part of the white loss is imaginary since the original estimate of white enrollment was overblown. This is extremely difficult to check. State aid to local schools is based on average daily attendance, at least in most states. There is a financial advantage in overstating the figures. To what degree, if any, such overstatement occurred is not known. Yet, the argument is plausible.

Rossell's case is the strongest yet. It contradicts the oft-repeated contention that big-city desegregation with large-scale busing is doomed to end in resegregation. It will be interesting to study other analyses as they appear.

Suburban Segregation

A frequent assumption in desegregation studies is that when blacks move to suburbs, the result will be a strengthening of residential desegregation. Suburbs, in other words, are thought of as less

30. See General Accounting Office, *Student Enrollment and Attendance Reports in the Boston Public School System Are Substantially Accurate* (Washington, D.C.: Comptroller General of the U.S., July 16, 1976), p. 14, and Kentucky Commission on Human Relations, *Segregation Persists in Jefferson County Schools 1975-76* (Frankfort: The Commission, April 1976), and additional report listed in footnote 5, above.

segregated than the central cities in any metropolitan area. Gary Orfield reminds us that "as ghettos spill out across suburban boundary lines in some major cities, blacks are inheriting some older garden apartment areas, but in a fashion that extends rather than diminishes residential and school segregation."[31]

Geographer Joe T. Darden has made one of the rare studies of the subject. He analyzed residential segregation in the suburbs and adjoining central cities in ten metropolitan areas of Michigan. He also noted changes over the period 1960-1970. The figures are Taeuber index numbers; the higher the number, the greater the degree of segregation:[32]

Metropolitan area	Taeuber index 1970: Central city	Suburbs	Suburbs 1960	Index point change, Suburbs, 1960-1970
Detroit	78.2	92.2	89.8	+2.4
Muskegon	70.8	87.7	82.2	+5.5
Flint	77.7	82.8	72.9	+9.9
Jackson	67.1	81.0	87.4	−6.4
Saginaw	78.4	79.7	73.7	+6.0
Ann Arbor	41.1	58.3	77.1	−18.8
Lansing	59.2	58.2	55.2	+3.0
Bay City	67.8	56.0	N.A.	N.A.
Grand Rapids	80.0	51.6	59.8	−8.2
Kalamazoo	72.9	42.8	44.0	−1.2
Mean	69.3	69.0	71.3	−2.3

Two trends are evident: (1) suburban segregation declined somewhat between 1960 and 1970; and (2) in six out of ten metropolitan areas, residential segregation in suburbs was greater than in adjacent central cities.

Darden warns:[33]

> . . . If the present trends continue, by 1980 Michigan's suburbs will be more segregated than Michigan's central cities. Although now small in size, the residential patterns for the evolution of massive suburban ghettos similar to those in central cities have been established.

He calls for a metropolitan-wide policy to reduce residential segregation. Because different parts of the metropolitan area are experiencing varying trends in segregation, only a metropolitan approach would encompass areas of differing experience. Planning for metropolitan school desegregation would be self-limiting if it failed to take into account metropolitan housing patterns. Also, as Darden points out, planners cannot be hopeful that higher black income in the suburbs will itself prevent the spread of residential

31. Gary Orfield, *If Wishes Were Houses Then Busing Could Stop, Demographic Trends and Desegregation Policy*, prepared for the Conference on School Desegregation in Metropolitan Areas, National Institute of Education, March 1977, p. 14.
32. Joe T. Darden, "Residential Segregation of Blacks in the Suburbs: The Michigan Example," *Geographical Survey*, 5 (July 1976), pp. 12-13.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

segregation. Even now, suburban blacks in Michigan have a higher socioeconomic status than blacks in central cities; yet, the segregation index numbers are almost identical (69.3 and 69.0).

The White Flight Argument

The argument around white flight that has raged for two years goes on apace. Recently, two researchers have added a new note, and a welcome one it is. Instead of conceiving of white flight as a response to central city desegregation, as most of the disputants do, Michael R. Fitzgerald and David R. Morgan try to determine the degree to which white departure from central cities is an expression of many factors, including school desegregation.

In 1960 and 1970 they studied 185 cities with a population of 50,000 or more whose school population contained at least 3 percent blacks. Desegregation data covered the years 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974. Degree of school segregation was measured by the Taeuber index which – almost exactly as in the case of Rossell – was found to correlate -.89 with the Coleman index. Social and economic factors of possible significance in causing white departure from the cities included crowded housing, crime, poverty, percentage black of population, and others.

When such factors were considered along with city-wide declines in white school enrollment, here is what the researchers found:[34]

> . . . The northern cities suffering the most substantial percentage decrease in white enrollment were also those which realized relatively greater poverty disadvantage, crime rates, relative black populations, and larger increases in their black populations . . . While the level of association was generally rather mild, northern cities which manifested relatively greater losses in white enrollments also tended to show greater central city disadvantage as to crowded housing and owner-occupied housing availability (as expected), assess heavier property taxes, and have somewhat larger school district enrollments.

Taking only the 106 northern cities, Fitzgerald and Morgan found that relatively high white out-migration was not associated with relatively high levels of desegregation. The same was true for the seventy-nine southern cities.

Two factors were found to be of major importance in influencing the percent white in northern cities: (1) the relative presence of blacks in the community, and (2) the growth of that part of the population between 1960 and 1970. The higher these were, the greater the white out-migration. This held true whether or not the city's schools were desegregated. Two lesser influences were the

34. Michael R. Fitzgerald and David R. Morgan, *Assessing the Consequences of Public Policy: School Desegregation and White Flight in Urban America.* Prepared for delivery at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 21-23, 1977, p. 13.

general impoverishment of central cities and high property taxes. The researchers emphasize that creating racial stability in the central cities requires an across-the-board attack on such broad factors as housing, crime and poverty that make them increasingly unpleasant places to live.

The staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted a survey of 1,292 public school superintendents; 996 or 77 percent replied. The replies made it possible to study, among other things, the effect of desegregation on white enrollment. A principal finding was that "very little variation is evident in the average reduction of proportion of white students between the districts that have desegregated and those that have not; or between those that have desegregated by court order, by HEW pressure, or by local initiative . . ."[35] With reference to a possible *district-wide* tipping point, the staff found that "when the black enrollment of a school district exceeds forty percent, there is . . . a larger relative loss of white students, but this has taken place regardless of desegregation interventions or court pressures."[36]

In a study prepared in 1977, Armor stated that "desegregation plans involving a substantial amount of white student reassignment generate a considerable degree of white loss in excess of the losses expected without such desegregation plans."[37] He based this statement on his analysis of nine school districts: Boston, Denver, Pasadena, Pontiac, Springfield (Mass.), Indianapolis, Prince George's County, San Francisco, and Detroit. These locations, Armor explained, were the only "northern school districts which had begun court-ordered mandatory desegregation by 1975, which had 1968 enrollments over 20,000, and which had over 20 percent minority enrollment prior to the start of desegregation."[38] He also held that while the white loss was greatest the first year of desegregation, it continued for four or more years in some cases.

Choosing somewhat different criteria for large cities, Reynolds Farley arrived at a conclusion similar to Armor's about desegregation and white flight in large school districts. (He rejects, however, the argument about the duration of white decline.) Farley writes:[39]

> . . . In large central cities — 400,000 or more — where blacks made up more than one-third of the enrollment, rather large declines in white enrollment were associated with substantial school disegregation . . . During the year of desegregation in such cities, the loss of whites was about twice as great as would be expected in the absence of school desegregation.

35. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Reviewing a Decade of School Desegregation 1966-1975. Report of a National Survey of School Superintendents* (Washington, D.C.: The Commission, January 1977), p. 6. 36. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
37. Armor, "Offer of Proof in Reference to the Testimony of David J. Armor," p. 17.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Reynolds Farley, *Can Governmental Policies Integrate Public Schools?* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Population Studies Center, September 1976), p. 7.

In these largest cities, Farley suggested most of the white flight took place at the beginning of desegregation.[40]

Aside from the largest cities, Farley rejected the thesis of white flight being due to desegregation. In a study of 116 cities in the 100 largest metropolitan areas, he found that cities that had desegregated did not experience any greater decline in white enrollment than cities that had not desegregated. (The staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had come to the same conclusion, as reported above.) Farley also observed that resegregation had not resulted in the very large cities that had desegregated and in which white enrollment had decreased. He mentioned Boston, Memphis, Oklahoma City, and San Francisco. On the other hand, during 1968-1974, cities like Chicago, Detroit, Newark, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. remained as segregated as ever and still lost one-third of their white students.

Farley cautions about the fallible practice of equating white flight with a drop in white enrollment: "We do not know how many white students actually withdrew from the schools, how much of the change is due to the aging of the white population or to an improved identification of Spanish heritage students."[41] Another factor, not mentioned by Farley, came up recently in Boston. A federal agency attempting to verify that city's school enrollment succeeded in obtaining data on everything except the number of new admissions. When queried about the missing information, a school official reported the data had been fed into a computer but the tape was inadvertently erased.[42] As a result, the Boston enrollment for 1975 is understated and racial information is incomplete.

On the broader problem of white flight, Farley underscores the need for government policies to reduce residential segregation. Such policies can only aid efforts to desegregate schools. In the very large cities, he concludes, "metropolitan school integration plans are the only ones which guarantee constitutional rights."[43]

The general debate between Coleman and some of his major critics at least through 1975 is best represented in an exchange of articles early in 1976.[44] Neither side gave any ground.

In September 1976, Coleman reformulated his ideas without any change of substance. He concluded:[45]

> . . . Compulsory two way busing, or compulsory assignment of white children to schools in neighborhoods that are homogeneously black, has not worked in cities. It simply has not produced racially stable schools.

40. Edward B. Fiske, "Scholar Eases Criticism of Study of White Flight," *New York Times*, September 3, 1976.
41. Farley, *Can Governmental Policies Integrate Public Schools?* p. 4.
42. GAO, *Student Enrollment and Attendance Reports*, pp. 17-18.
43. Farley, *Can Governmental Policies Integrate Public Schools?* p. 9.
44. See Thomas F. Pettigrew and Robert L. Green, "School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman 'White Flight Thesis'," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 46 No. 1 (February 1976), pp. 1-53; James S. Coleman, "Response to Professors Pettigrew and Green," *ibid.*, Vol. 46 No. 2 (May 1976), pp. 217-24; Pettigrew and Green, "A Reply to Professor Coleman," *ibid.*, pp. 225-33.
45. Coleman, *Presentation on School Desegregation and White Flight*, p. 7.

Rossell's data suggest it did work in Boston. Coleman summarized his argument in three sentences:

> In the large cities, and to a lesser extent in the medium-sized cities, desegregation did produce a loss of whites in the year of desegregation.
> This loss is intensified in both sets of cities, when the proportion of blacks in the district is high.
> The loss is also intensified in both sets of cities when the city district is surrounded by predominantly white suburban districts in the same metropolitan area.

There is fairly general agreement on the second and third sentences.

On the first one, however, there is considerable disagreement. A number of studies – including an early one by Coleman himself – have found no white flight effect in medium-sized cities. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' findings were also contrary to this assertion.

On another matter – the duration of white flight effects in large cities – Coleman wrote in 1976:[46]

> . . . The desegregation loss did diminish after the desegregation year. But it did not vanish. It still remained nearly twice as large as the pre-desegregation year.

As we saw above, Armor believes there is much stronger and longer effect period than that. Coleman's statement is closer to Farley's.

Concluding Observations

Much of the recent research reported in the section "Six Places" contradicts many of the propositions that underly the Coleman thesis of white flight. In Jefferson County, Florida, and Boston, where large-scale busing was used, stable desegregation has resulted. Even in scattered locations throughout Illinois, in the absence of deliberate desegregation, we find conditions that are uncongenial to a general thesis of white flight. The stable schools in which whites continue to be a minority are of especial interest. The Kansas City study, also a case of unplanned desegregation, parallels Illinois in some respects but also affords some support to the white flight thesis. (Strictly speaking, both Illinois and Kansas City are irrelevant since the white flight thesis concerns only planned and mandatory desegregation.)

Orfield and Darden remind us to go beyond slogans of metropolitanization. Unnoticed, residential segregation has found a welcome home in the suburbs. For blacks, the suburbs are not the open-housing haven many have wished them to be. The implications of this fact for the future of desegregated schools are serious.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

With respect to the white flight argument, both sides concede that more than school desegregation may affect it. Until, however, Fitzgerald and Morgan completed their study, this was a matter of speculation. It has by *no* means been settled. Hopefully, future students of white flight will spread their wings and fly on to broader considerations rather than continue to hop around in the barnyard.

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Letters to the Editor

The following letter from Martin Patchen refers to a discussion of his work in the *Research Review of Equal Education* 1 (Winter 1977).

Dear Mr. Weinberg:

Two of the papers to which you referred in the review, "Interracial Perceptions . . ." and "Determinants of Students' Interracial Behavior and Opinion Change" were published recently. The first appeared in December 1976 *Sociometry*, the second in the January 1977 *Sociology of Education*.

Most of the summary of our work in the Review is, I think, quite good. However, I might point out two inaccuracies. One is the statement that our sample consisted of 60 black and 60 white students from ten schools. Actually, our original sample in general consisted of 60 black and 60 white students from *each class* of each of twelve school sites. (Not all twelve sites are included in every analysis.) Thus, the original sample was about 5400 students, of whom about 2000 blacks and about 2200 whites acceptably completed questionnaires. A second point concerns the statement (p. 19) that avoidance does not result from unpleasant interaction. The finding we reported is that avoidance was not related to the amount of opportunity for interracial contact. However, for both Blacks and Whites, avoidance was moderately connected with the reported frequency of unfriendly actions by students of the other race. Overall, I found your review of materials in the area quite useful.

Again, thanks for keeping us informed.

Cordially,
Martin Patchen
Professor of Sociology

Science is a great and worthy mistress, but there is one greater and that is Humanity which science serves; one thing there is greater than knowledge and that is the *Man* who knows.

—W. E. B. Du Bois, "Galileo Galilei," 1908

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